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[Excerpt] The importance of status in markets is well established. Since Podolny (1993) introduced his 
status-based model of market competition, more than 160 articles published in top management and 
sociology journals have explored this area. These articles show that market status affects a broad range 
of outcomes, including the perceived quality and legitimacy of organizations, the costs of producing a 
given level of quality, the prices that organizations can charge for specific products, their attractiveness 
as exchange partners, and their ability to exercise agency. Despite the widespread agreement that status 
plays an important role in markets, there is less agreement about how to define status. Status has 
traditionally been defined as a position in a social system that can be ranked among other positions 
based on relative prestige or social esteem (Weber, 1968; Linton, 1936; Merton, 1957). Following Podolny 
(1993), however, status has more recently been redefined simply as a signal of quality, thus removing 
status from its traditional anchoring in the social system. We argue that defining status as a signal of 
quality unnecessarily limits the explanatory power of status and confuses status with other signals of 
quality, most notably reputation. We develop instead a framework for studying status in markets that 
integrates work on status as social positions (Linton, 1936; Merton, 1957) and work on identity as social 
categories (Hannan, Polos, and Carroll, 2007), thus providing a more comprehensive perspective on 
status in markets. 
We seek to accomplish three specific objectives in this chapter. First, we develop a new conceptual 
framework that integrates theoretical research on status and identity to clarify what we understand by 
status in markets. Our status-identity framework builds on the definition of status as a position in a social 
system. However, we add that these positions entail identities that reside in the intersections of the 
horizontally and vertically differentiated social categories that define the social system. Our status-
identity framework builds extensively on the existing research on status and identity because we seek to 
provide conceptual clarity to existing and future research on status and identity rather than distancing 
ourselves from that research. We emphasize that our framework must not only help distinguish status 
from other related theoretical concepts such as reputation and legitimacy, but must also be useful in 
empirical research by helping to develop theory-driven research agendas. Second, we use our status-
identity framework to systematically review existing research on status in markets. Rather than reviewing 
all market status research, we use our framework to identify the most important theory-driven research 
questions, and then provide a selective review of how these questions have been addressed in empirical 
research. Third, having used the status-identity framework to identify important research questions and to 
evaluate how existing research addresses these questions, we then identify and discuss more 
systematically the most important areas for future research. 
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4 The importance of status 
in markets: A market identity 
perspective
M I C H A E L  J E N S E N ,  BO K Y U N G  K I M ,  
A N D  H E E Y O N  K I M
The importance of status in markets is well established. Since 
Podolny (1993) introduced his status-based model of market com­
petition, more than 160 articles published in top management and 
sociology journals have explored this area. These articles show that 
market status affects a broad range of outcomes, including the per­
ceived quality and legitimacy of organizations, the costs of produ­
cing a given level of quality, the prices that organizations can charge 
for specific products, their attractiveness as exchange partners, 
and their ability to exercise agency. Despite the widespread agree­
ment that status plays an important role in markets, there is less 
agreement about how to define status. Status has traditionally been 
defined as a position in a social system that can be ranked among 
other positions based on relative prestige or social esteem (Weber, 
1968; Linton, 1936; Merton, 1957). Following Podolny (1993), 
however, status has more recently been redefined simply as a signal 
of quality, thus removing status from its traditional anchoring in the 
social system. We argue that defining status as a signal of quality 
unnecessarily limits the explanatory power of status and confuses 
status with other signals of quality, most notably reputation. We 
develop instead a framework for studying status in markets that 
integrates work on status as social positions (Linton, 1936; Merton, 
1957) and work on identity as social categories (Hannan, Polos, and 
Carroll, 2007), thus providing a more comprehensive perspective on 
status in markets.
We seek to accomplish three specific objectives in this chapter. 
First, we develop a new conceptual framework that integrates theor­
etical research on status and identity to clarify what we understand 
by status in markets. Our status-identity framework builds on the
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definition of status as a position in a social system. However, we add 
that these positions entail identities that reside in the intersections 
of the horizontally and vertically differentiated social categories that 
define the social system. Our status-identity framework builds exten­
sively on the existing research on status and identity because we seek 
to provide conceptual clarity to existing and future research on status 
and identity rather than distancing ourselves from that research. We 
emphasize that our framework must not only help distinguish status 
from other related theoretical concepts such as reputation and legit­
imacy, but must also be useful in empirical research by helping to 
develop theory-driven research agendas. Second, we use our status- 
identity framework to systematically review existing research on 
status in markets. Rather than reviewing all market status research, 
we use our framework to identify the most important theory-driven 
research questions, and then provide a selective review of how these 
questions have been addressed in empirical research. Third, having 
used the status-identity framework to identify important research 
questions and to evaluate how existing research addresses these ques­
tions, we then identify and discuss more systematically the most 
important areas for future research.
Before developing our status-identity framework, it is useful to 
briefly explain our philosophical and methodological approach. 
Philosophically, we view status simply as a theoretical construct and 
are therefore concerned less with the ontology of status and more with 
the epistemology of status. The epistemological value of status as a 
theoretical construct and therefore the value of our status-identity 
framework depends mainly on the specific insights obtained through 
its use in specific empirical research projects. Methodologically, we 
focus primarily on empirical research published in the Academ y  
o f  M anagement Journal, Academ y o f  M anagement Review, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, American Journal o f  Sociology, 
American Sociological Review, M anagement Science, Organization 
Science, and Strategic M anagement Journal from 1993 to 2008. We 
focus on these journals and the period from 1993 onward because the 
vast majority of research on market status appeared in these journals 
and because the interest in status before Podolny (1993) introduced 
his status-based model of market competition was more sporadic. 
We also limit our review to macro-research focusing on markets and 
organizations, and do not consider micro-research that focuses on
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individuals and small groups, an area covered by other chapters in 
this volume.
The status-identity framework
Our survey of status in markets research revealed that fifteen of the 
thirty-nine articles that provide an explicit definition of status define 
it simply as a signal of quality. Therefore, we begin by discussing the 
theoretical foundations for research that defines status as a market 
signal and show how it sets the stage for equating status and repu­
tation. We then revisit early sociological work on status as positions 
in social systems and more recent work on identity as social cat­
egories to develop the theoretical foundation for our status-identity 
framework.
Status an d  signaling
Podolny (1993, p. 830) defined status as the perceived quality of an 
organization in relation to the perceived quality of other competing 
organizations and he noted that it is critical to view status as a signal 
of underlying product quality. Following Spence (1974), status can 
function as a signal of quality for two reasons: First, the status of an 
organization is partly decided by its previous actions, which means 
that an organization can exercise at least some control over its sta­
tus. Second, the difficulty of acquiring high status is inversely related 
to the ability of organizations to actually deliver the corresponding 
product quality. Defining status as a signal of quality is not necessar­
ily inconsistent with defining status as a position in a social system, 
but viewing status only as a signal of quality results in a narrower 
conceptualization of status. By viewing it in this way, status is ultim­
ately dislocated from social structure, and turned into a resource 
that some organizations possess independently of other organiza­
tions. The conceptualization of status as a signal of quality domi­
nates not only Podolny’s own subsequent work on status, especially 
his early work (including Podolny, 1994, and Podolny and Stuart 
1995), but also the work of other scholars including Baker, Faulkner, 
and Fisher (1998), Chung, Singh, and Lee (2000), Haas and Hansen 
(2007), and Chen, Hambrick, and Pollock (2008). Our main concern 
with defining status as a signal of quality is not that status does not
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function as a signal of quality -  typically it does -  but that it is not 
always a signal of quality and that it is often more than a signal of 
quality.
Status an d  repu tation
By viewing status as a signal of quality, Podolny (1993) provided the 
theoretical foundation for equating status with reputation in sub­
sequent research, including Stuart (2000), Geletkanycz, Boyd, and 
Finkelstein (2001), Gulati and Higgins (2003), Rao, Monin, and 
Durand (2003), and Rhee and Haunschild (2006). Equating status 
and reputation does not necessarily question the empirical results 
of these studies because both status and reputation function as sig­
nals of quality. However, status is not the same as reputation. Most 
economists define reputation as a prediction about future behav­
ior that is derived from the history of previously observed actions 
(Wilson, 1985, pp. 27-28), thus emphasizing the importance of 
reputation as a market signal. Even if both status and reputation 
function as signals of quality, it is important to distinguish theoret­
ically between status and reputation, a point we are not the first to 
make. Washington and Zajac (2005, p. 284) suggested that reputa­
tion refers to a summary categorization of historical differences in 
quality among actors, whereas status refers to a socially constructed 
ordering or ranking of actors in a social system. More uniquely, they 
emphasized that reputation captures differences in quality that gen­
erate earned, performance-based rewards but that status captures 
differences in social rank that generate unearned, non-performance- 
based privilege.
Jensen and Roy (2008) also agreed that it is important to dis­
tinguish between status and reputation. They defined status as the 
prestige accorded to organizations because of their positions in the 
social structure and reputation as the prestige accorded to organi­
zations because of how they have carried out particular activities 
in the past. Jensen and Roy did not restrict status to the unearned 
ascription of social rank, however, but allowed, as did Weber (1968), 
privilege-granting status positions to be earned (achieved status) or 
unearned (ascribed status). They emphasized instead that status is 
an actor-level concept, whereas reputation is an attribute-level con­
cept -  a social actor occupies only one status in a social system (but
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can occupy different statuses in different social systems), which gives 
the actor one status with the sam e audience, whereas an actor may 
simultaneously have a positive reputation and a negative reputation 
on different attributes with the sam e audience. Although Jensen and 
Roy (2008) did not define status and reputation as signals of quality, 
their distinction between status and reputation also affects how they 
function  as signals of quality -  status provides an assessment of the 
quality of the organization as a whole, whereas reputation provides 
an assessment of the quality of individual organizational attributes. 
Finally, even if Podolny (1993) first provided the impetus for defining 
status as a market signal and using status and reputation interchange­
ably, he later noted that status is best defined as a position in a social 
system that determines opportunities and constraints, and that repu­
tation is best defined as an expectation of some behaviors based on 
past demonstrations of these same behaviors (Podolny, 2005).
Status an d  identity
We agree with Washington and Zajac (2005), Jensen and Roy (2008), 
and Podolny (2005) that it is important to distinguish between status 
and reputation and that status is best defined as a position in a social 
system. However, we add that it is useful to refine the definition of 
status as a position in a social system in two ways. First, following 
Linton (1936) and Merton (1957), we distinguish between social sta­
tus and social roles, and argue that both concepts reflect commonly 
shared cognitive categories. Linton (1936, p. 113) defined social sta­
tus as a position in a social system that encompasses a collection of 
rights and duties, and social roles as the enactment of a status that 
puts rights and duties into effect. Linton (1936, p. 114) continued 
by stating that status and roles together represent “the minimum of 
attitudes and behavior” that individuals must assume to participate 
in a given social system. Or, as expressed by Merton (1957, p. 110), 
status and roles serve to connect “culturally defined expectations” 
with the patterned conducts and relationships that define social sys­
tems. We argue that the minimal attitudes and behaviors or cultural 
expectations identified by Linton (1936) and Merton (1957) form 
the core elements of market identities. The two dominant market 
identities in French gastronomy, classical and nouvelle cuisines, for 
example, represent different positions in that they embody different
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expectations about cooking methods, typical ingredients, chef roles, 
and menu organization (Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2005).
The market identity of an organization is its membership in a social 
category that is used to identify a social actor and specify what to 
expect from the social actor (Jensen and Kim, 2009). The minimal 
attitudes and behaviors and culturally defined expectations identified 
by Linton (1936) and Merton (1957) correspond to the social codes 
or schema defaults that Hannan, Polos, and Carroll (2007, p. 102) 
argued constitute the core elements of identities. Market identities 
serve an important function as interfaces between organizations and 
their audiences. They prescribe the minimal expectations to claim­
ants of a particular identity and they allow the audiences to compare 
and evaluate different claimants of a particular identity (Zuckerman, 
1999). Just as Linton (1936) argued that some minimal attitudes and 
behaviors must be assumed to participate in a social system, Hannan, 
Polos, and Carroll (2007) argued that violations of the social codes 
that define identity bring about sanctions. The stock-market illegitim­
acy discount experienced by diversified organizations whose complex 
business portfolios did not conform to the focused industry categories 
used by security analysts illustrates the sanctions that can follow vio­
lating identity codes (Zuckerman, 1999). The identity expectations 
associated with a status-role complement are therefore ultimately 
what circumscribe the actions of the occupants of a status position. 
This conclusion is, interestingly, not foreign to Podolny (1993, pp. 846- 
847), who viewed identity as a position in the status order and argued 
that actors with an advantageous identity avoid actions that threaten 
their identity. Nor is it foreign to early sociology: Hughes (1937, 
p. 404) noted, for example, that “status assigns individuals to various 
social categories; each category has its own rights and duties.”
Second, following Sorokin (1959) and Jensen (2010), we argue that 
positions within a social system are usefully defined along a horizon­
tal and a vertical dimension. The horizontal dimension divides the 
social system into different categories based on different properties 
and attributes, while the vertical dimension divides the social system 
into different categories based on a shared ranking of the members of a 
particular horizontal category. The horizontal dimension of the social 
system, for example, refers to an array of product categories and the 
vertical dimension refers to a ranking (whether based on size, quality, 
exchange partners, or something else) of the organizations within a
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particular product category. When Linton (1936) and Merton (1957) 
defined status as positions in a social system, they referred mainly to 
the horizontal dimension, as evidenced by their examples of statuses 
such as male, physician, and professor. It is important to distinguish 
between horizontal and vertical dimensions, however, because the 
differences within a horizontal category may be as important or even 
more important than the differences between horizontal categories. 
The prestige granted to professors, for example, probably varies as 
much within an academic discipline (vertical) as does the prestige of 
different academic disciplines (horizontal). In summary, when we 
define status as a position in a social system, we therefore refer to a 
particular horizontal and vertical intersection, and when we define 
market identity as a social category, we refer to the schema that codi­
fies the expectations to that particular intersection.
Figure 4.1 illustrates our status-identity framework. The horizon­
tal axis arrays the social actors based on similarity in attributes and 
the vertical axis arrays the social actors based on similarity in rank, 
with the intersection defining a status market and its corresponding 
identity. A bank may, as shown in Figure 4.2, be categorized hori­
zontally as an investment bank based on its business portfolio and 
vertically as highly ranked based on its market share or client port­
folio, which together gives the bank its status market and identity as
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a “high-status investment bank.” In other words, our status-identity 
framework suggests that the horizontal and vertical dimensions in 
isolation simply represent categories of similar organizations, but 
that their intersections represent a status position and its correspond­
ing market identity. The minimal attitudes and cultural expectations 
(Linton, 1936; Merton, 1957) or social codes and schema defaults 
(Hannan, Polos, and Carroll, 2007) are only fully specified in the 
intersections. Although most current research on status in markets 
focuses only on the vertical status differences between organiza­
tions within a horizontal category, we seek to clarify the relationship 
between status as positions and identity as categories by emphasiz­
ing both  the horizontal and  the vertical dimensions. Having outlined 
our status-identity framework, we next use it to review prior status 
research and identify promising new research areas.
Market status research
Regardless of the specific empirical context, our status-identity 
framework raises three different types of research questions. The first 
type of question focuses simply on the advantages and disadvantages 
of memberships in specific horizontal and vertical categories within 
the market space. The second type of question takes the horizontal 
and vertical categories for granted but allows mobility within the 
current configuration of categories. The third type of question treats
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the horizontal and vertical categories as endogenous structures and 
focuses on the creation and destruction of the horizontal and vertical 
categories themselves.
M arket sp aces  w ithou t organ ization al m obility
The first type of research question takes the current configuration 
of horizontal and vertical categories as well as the positions organi­
zations occupy within the market space for granted. With the con­
figuration of the market space and the position of organizations 
within the market space fixed, the main focus becomes how the posi­
tions organizations occupy affect their behavior and performance. 
Although organizations differ in both the horizontal and the vertical 
positions they occupy, the common identification of status with ver­
tical positions leads us to focus mainly on the advantages and dis­
advantages of vertical positions. The advantages and disadvantages 
of horizontal positions are the main focus in industrial organization 
(Caves, 1980; Porter, 1979), but this research is beyond the scope of 
our chapter.
Advantages of vertical positions
Based on our review of status research in markets, we found that 
most research focuses on how vertical positions affect quality, grant 
agency, and provide legitimacy.
Quality. Vertical positions affect perceived quality in two differ­
ent ways. First, by functioning as signals of quality, vertical positions 
affect the perceived value of organizations, which ultimately increases 
their revenue streams and attractiveness as exchange partners. When 
the quality of the products is unobservable or otherwise difficult to 
determine a priori, customers depend instead on the observable status 
of the organizations behind the products to infer the actual quality 
of the products (Podolny, 1994). The products of organizations in 
higher vertical positions are therefore perceived to be higher quality 
and less risky than those of organizations in lower positions, which 
allow them to charge a premium for their products and to attract 
potential exchange partners. Several studies have tested different ver­
sions of this argument, including Podolny (1994), Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1996), Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan (1996), Stuart 
(2000), Gulati and Higgins (2003), Hoetker, Swaminathan, and
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Mitchell (2007), and Rosenkopf and Padula (2008). Benjamin and 
Podolny (1999), for example, showed that a high-status winery could 
charge a higher price for a bottle of wine than other organizations, 
even after controlling for the quality of the wine and the cost of the 
grapes. In addition, Baker, Faulkner, and Fisher (1998) argued that 
client organizations used the status of advertisement agencies as an 
indicator of quality and that they therefore assigned more value to 
relationships with high-status advertisement agencies, which lowered 
the risk of dissolving their relationships with these agencies.
Second, vertical positions also affect the cost at which organizations 
can produce a given level of quality. The aforementioned advantages 
of higher vertical positions and their at least partial transferability 
through exchange relationships make organizations in these positions 
attractive exchange partners and allow them to form exchange rela­
tionships at a lower cost than other organizations. Several studies have 
tested different versions of this argument, including Podolny (1993), 
Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999), Sine, Shane, and Di Gregorio 
(2003), and Uzzi and Lancaster (2004). Podolny (1993) found that 
high-status investment banks could underwrite bonds at a lower cost 
than low-status banks because they generally had lower transac­
tion costs. Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999) similarly reported that 
endorsements by prominent institutions enabled privately held biotech 
organizations to go to IPO faster and to earn better IPO valuations 
than those without endorsements because the prominent endorse­
ments helped increase the perceived quality of the biotech organiza­
tions. Uzzi and Lancaster (2004) showed that corporate clients also 
preferred transactions with high-status law organizations. They rea­
soned that although high-status law organizations initially charged 
higher prices than other law organizations, the overall costs of legal 
services provided by high-status organizations were lower than those 
provided by low-status organizations because of their higher quality.
Agency. Vertical positions affect not only quality but also provide 
a source of agency that allows some organizations to exercise more 
control over their surroundings and act more independently than 
other organizations. A few studies have tested different versions 
of this argument, including Stuart (1998), Phillips and Zuckerman 
(2001), and Guler (2007). Stuart (1998) argued that high-status 
organizations are in a position where they have superior bargain­
ing power over low-status organizations, which enables them to
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secure favorable contract terms. Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) 
focused on the middle-status conformity argument and found that 
middle-status law organizations were the least likely to deviate by 
beginning to practice family law compared to low- and high-status 
law organizations. According to their argument, high-status organ­
izations have a secure membership in the given category, so they 
experience less pressure to conform to the norms of the category 
and avoid practicing family law. Low-status organizations also have 
the freedom to defy because they are not perceived as legitimate 
players in the category and audiences in general do not care much 
about their behavior. Middle-status organizations, however, may 
lose the opportunity to move upward in the status hierarchy or may 
even risk losing their position as legitimate players by not conform­
ing to the norms. Guler (2007) argued similarly that high-status 
organizations can act independently of social pressures and showed 
that high-status venture capitals were more likely to terminate their 
investments in less promising organizations.
Legitimacy. In addition to quality and agency, vertical positions 
also provide organizations with legitimacy or social acceptability. 
The diffusion of new practices reflects an important legitimacy 
concern. Status-based imitation provides a solution to the problem 
of whether or not to adopt new practices or abandon established 
practices to earn legitimacy through direct or indirect affiliations. 
Some studies have tested different versions of this argument, includ­
ing Davis and Greve (1997), Haunschild and Miner (1997), Rao, 
Monin, and Durand (2003), and Sanders and Tuschke (2007). Davis 
and Greve (1997) emphasized the positive effect of the participation 
of high-status organizations in the diffusion of the poison pill, a 
then new controversial corporate governance practice. Participants 
also imitate high-status organizations in order to claim indirect 
affiliations, if there exists no direct association with high-status 
organizations which increases their perception of legitimacy and 
visibility. Haunschild and Miner (1997) argued that organizations 
adopted an organizational practice of hiring an investment bank to 
obtain advice on acquisitions in an attempt to raise their status level 
by imitating high-status organizations. Rao, Monin, and Durand 
(2003) focused on the effects of high-status chefs on the institutional 
change from classical cuisine to nouvelle cuisine in the French res­
taurant industry. They argued that the high-status positions of early
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defectors conferred legitimacy on the identity movement from clas­
sical cuisine to nouvelle cuisine, encouraging more chefs to abandon 
the rules of classical cuisine to embrace nouvelle cuisine.
Disadvantages of vertical positions
A vertical position can also limit agency and therefore organizational 
growth. Although organizations in higher vertical positions are able 
to produce a given quality at a lower cost and generate higher rev­
enue streams, they cannot necessarily expand their market to that 
of organizations in lower vertical positions. Podolny (1993) argued 
that when high-status organizations start expanding into markets 
frequented by low-status organizations, they could lose the benefits 
that come with their higher vertical positions. The reason is status 
leakage (Podolny, 1994) -  because status is transferred through affili­
ations, affiliating with low-status organizations could reduce the sta­
tus of a high-status organization, thus threatening the organization’s 
own vertical position. Podolny (1994) showed empirically that high- 
status investment banks did not totally dominate the primary secur­
ities market, despite the fact that they were able to issue a security of 
a given quality at a lower cost. These high-status investment banks 
were reluctant to enter the non-investment grade market which was 
generally populated with low-status investment banks. Gould (2002) 
approached the same phenomenon from a different angle and argued 
that the limit of the number of ties that high-status organizations 
can form circumscribe high-status organizations from entering into 
low-status markets. Because high-status organizations use most of 
their limited resources to form a relationship with other high-status 
organizations or categories, they lack resources to expand beyond 
their own high-status markets.
Vertical positions can also magnify negative consequences of fail­
ure, which is referred to as an inverse Matthew effect: the more you 
have, the more that can be taken away (Jensen, 2006). As mentioned 
above, high-status organizations have a secure membership in the 
given category and thus can deviate from the prevailing norms more 
easily (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001). High-status organizations 
may be punished more severely, however, if they deviate from core 
aspects of their market identity (Hsu and Hannan, 2005). High- 
status organizations are more conspicuous in the eyes of their audi­
ences and the audiences tend to have higher expectations of these
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organizations. As such, deviations from the core aspects of market 
identities are more easily noticed by the audiences and they may even 
regard these deviations as severe threats to the standing of the mar­
ket identities, causing audiences to punish those deviated high-status 
organizations more severely (Jensen, 2006). Several studies have 
tested different versions of this argument, including Jensen (2006), 
Rhee and Haunschild (2006), and Durand, Rao, and Monin (2007). 
Jensen (2006) argued that Arthur Andersen, a high-status auditing 
firm, collapsed more dramatically after its association with account­
ing fraud following the collapse of Enron in 2001 because its cli­
ents valued it primarily for its uncompromised high-status position. 
Similarly, Durand, Rao, and Monin (2007) analyzed French haute 
cuisine restaurants to examine the inverse Matthew effect and found 
that the attempts of high-status restaurants to change social codes 
that defined the core aspects of the market identities tended to receive 
less positive evaluations from food critics.
Advantages and disadvantages of occupying multiple positions
In developing our status-identity framework, we focused on organi­
zations that only occupy one position within the market space. 
However, some highly diversified organizations occupy more than 
one position within a horizontal category or across horizontal cat­
egories. Most research on status and identity concentrates on the 
disadvantages of occupying multiple positions. If organizations 
occupy more than one vertical position in the same horizontal 
category, status leakage suggests that they may lose some of the 
prestige accorded to the high-status position (Podolny, 1994). If 
organizations occupy more than one horizontal category, the mul­
tiple positions may attract a broader audience from different cat­
egories, but the fit of each position to the corresponding horizontal 
category expectation is worse than those of single-position organi­
zations (Hsu, 2006; Hsu, Hannan, and Ko^ak, 2009). Therefore, 
in both cases, organizations experience negative consequences by 
occupying multiple positions. Moreover, multiple-position organiza­
tions may be understood less easily by their audiences who, in many 
cases, use one-category schema to recognize potential members of 
the category, which ultimately affects organizations negatively. For 
example, Zuckerman (1999) showed that security analysts tended 
not to cover diversified companies that spanned various industries
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Figure 4.3 Multiple positions in the market space
which did not fit into the simple and traditional categories of secur­
ities analysts and caused the companies to experience the stock-mar­
ket illegitimacy discount.
We suggest that occupying multiple positions need not always be 
disadvantageous if the organization can shift the audience’s attention 
to a new category with different minimum attitudes and behaviors 
(Jensen, 2010), in other words, to a new market identity as presented 
in Figure 4.3. The conditions under which multiple positions affect 
organization positively are still relatively unexplored. A potentially 
important condition for successfully occupying multiple positions is 
that the multiple positions across different horizontal categories are 
within the same vertical status. When multiple horizontal positions 
are located within the same vertical status category, status leakage 
between the different positions is unlikely -  all the business units 
are of approximately the same status. The US conglomerate GE pro­
vides an example. The business units of GE include financial service 
(GE Capital), technology (GE Technology Infrastructure), energy 
(GE Energy Infrastructure), and entertainment (NBC Universal). 
Although in different horizontal categories, GE’s business units are 
all vertically ranked highly in their horizontal category. According to 
our framework, the company is not perceived as a high-status organ­
ization in any one industry, such as financial service or energy, or any 
combination of different industries, but as a high-status conglomerate 
with distinct attitudes and behaviors. There is little research on how
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spanning multiple positions can affect organizations positively and 
we suggest that future research on multiple-position organizations 
will help us develop a more nuanced understanding of our status- 
identity framework.
Future research on static market spaces without 
organizational mobility
In addition to the future research suggested above, there are other 
possibilities for future research on market status within the bound­
aries of static market spaces without organizational mobility. First, a 
closer examination of the origins of status has been proposed in several 
studies (D’Aveni, 1996; Chen, Hambrick, and Pollock, 2008). Chen, 
Hambrick, and Pollock (2008) pointed out that we still have a limited 
understanding of the initial forces that create the vertical status struc­
ture itself. D’Aveni (1996) also argued that more research on the inputs 
that create status can help us better understand how each organization 
initially comes to occupy a particular status position. Second, future 
research should examine questions related to the vertical distribution 
of organizations within a horizontal category. Some markets have a 
pyramid distribution with few high-status actors and many low-status 
actors, while other markets have actors distributed more evenly across 
vertical status levels. What are the factors that determine this distribu­
tion? What are the implications of different distributions or, in other 
words, how does the distribution of organizations within a horizontal 
category affect the advantages and disadvantages of occupying a cer­
tain position? Third, future studies should focus on providing a more 
nuanced understanding of how the perception of an organization is 
affected by its operations in other categories. While most research on 
organizations occupying multiple positions has been directed at organi­
zations occupying multiple horizontal positions, future research should 
also examine organizations occupying multiple vertical positions.
M arket spaces w ith organ ization al m ob ility
The second type of research question allows organizations to change 
positions within the market space but view the current configur­
ation of horizontal and vertical categories as exogenously given. 
Organizational mobility can take two forms: organizations can move 
horizontally from one product category to another and vertically
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Figure 4.4 Vertical and horizontal mobility in the market space
from one status category to another, as shown in Figure 4.4. Again, 
given the common identification of a status position with a vertical 
position, we focus mainly on vertical mobility and examine only 
horizontal mobility to the extent that it relates to vertical position. 
Our review of market status research shows that there is consider­
ably less research on vertical mobility within the market space than 
on the advantages and disadvantages of occupying particular vertical 
positions. This prioritization is not surprising given that the vertical 
distribution of organizations within the market space tends to be rela­
tively stable over time, with more organizations staying in the same 
positions than moving from one position to another.
Vertical organizational mobility
An organization can move to a higher or a lower vertical position in 
two different ways. First, when organizations understand the dom­
inant criterion for ranking organizations within a particular market 
space, they can make targeted investments to improve their ranking. 
For example, if product quality is an important criterion to rank 
organizations, organizations may decide to invest more resources in 
product quality both to improve actual quality and to maintain an 
already-established reputation for quality. Shapiro (1983) argued spe­
cifically that if an organization decides to enter the high-quality seg­
ment of a market in which product quality is difficult to observe, then 
it must initially invest in building a reputation for product quality by
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actually producing quality products. The minimum cultural expect­
ations for entering a particular vertical position therefore represent 
not necessarily an insurmountable barrier to entry, but function more 
like an entry cost. However, the entry cost could be high, because the 
organizations that already occupy higher-ranked vertical positions 
have several distinct position-based competitive advantages. As dis­
cussed above, the organizations in higher-ranked vertical positions 
can make products at a given level of quality at a lower cost than 
organizations occupying lower-ranked positions (Podolny, 1993) and 
they earn a higher return on their investments in product quality 
(Benjamin and Podolny, 1999).
Second, regardless of direct investments to improve their rankings, 
organizations may also attempt to move to a higher vertical position 
by affiliating with organizations in the desired vertical positions. 
To highlight the difference between reputation and status, Podolny 
(1994) argued that status, unlike reputation, which derives only from 
past performance, also derives from the status of affiliations and 
exchange partners. Podolny and Phillips (1996) developed a model 
of status growth according to which organizational status grows not 
only through their direct investments in reputation, but also thro­
ugh forming affiliations with high-status organizations. Similarly, 
Higgins and Gulati (2003) argued that by affiliating with prominent 
organizations, the focal organization can increase its status over time. 
They showed that the organizations with a greater number of upper- 
echelon members with prominent affiliations were able to attract a 
high-status investment bank as their lead underwriter for their IPO. 
However, obtaining the opportunities to affiliate with organizations 
from higher vertical positions could be illusive, due to status homoph- 
ily. The incentives for organizations in higher vertical positions to 
affiliate with organizations from lower vertical positions are not clear, 
given the potential threat that such affiliations pose to organizations 
in higher-status positions (Podolny, 1994). As Burris (2004) showed 
in his study of academic status hierarchies, status hierarchies are gen­
erally reproduced over time because organizations located in similar 
positions have a tendency to form relationships with each other.
An important assumption in research on vertical organizational 
mobility is that moving to a higher vertical position is always beneficial. 
Despite the disadvantages of higher vertical positions discussed above, 
it is reasonable to conclude that higher vertical positions generally
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are more advantageous than lower vertical positions. However, this 
does not imply that moving from a lower to a higher vertical pos­
ition cannot in itself have important negative consequences (Jensen 
and Kim, 2010). When organizations move from a lower vertical pos­
ition to a higher position, they may gain access to more resources 
and opportunities, but they also risk cognitive and social dislocation. 
Because moving to a higher vertical position implies adopting a dif­
ferent market identity, upward mobility could result in transgress­
ing the minimal expectations of an unfamiliar market identity, which 
could result in severe sanctions from important audiences. Similarly, 
to the extent that homophily pressures make it difficult to continue 
affiliating with organizations from lower vertical positions, moving 
to a higher vertical position could force the organization to rebuild 
its affiliation network, which could result in replacing trusted part­
ners with unknown partners. The negative consequences of vertical 
organizational mobility have largely been neglected in market status 
research. We suggest that an initial research agenda should focus on 
the extent to which the size and suddenness of vertical dislocation 
affect its negative consequences.
Horizontal organizational mobility
The vertical position an organization occupies may also affect horizon­
tal organizational mobility. Focusing on commercial banks entering 
the investment banking industry, Jensen (2003) reported that organi­
zations were more likely to use commercial banks from high vertical 
positions in commercial banking as lead managers in investment bank­
ing. He argued that vertical positions can be leveraged across horizon­
tal categories because they reduce the quality uncertainty associated 
with new entrants. Podolny and Scott Morton (1999) also examined 
the advantages of high-status organizations when entering new hori­
zontal categories. Their empirical analysis indicated that entrants from 
high vertical positions were more easily accepted into British shipping 
cartels because incumbents viewed their status in the previous markets 
as a signal of future cooperation. However, when entering a horizontal 
category from a high vertical position in another horizontal category, 
the entering organizations may also experience discrimination from 
the incumbent organizations because they pose a particularly strong 
challenge to those organizations. Jensen (2008) found that incumbent 
investment banking organizations were indeed reluctant to partner
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with entering commercial banks from high vertical positions, which 
is consistent with the incumbent investment banks fearing that these 
entering commercial banks could more easily change the industry log­
ics in ways that would favor commercial banks.
Given the ambivalent effects of vertical positions on horizontal 
organizational mobility, it is important to clarify under what condi­
tions vertical positions affect horizontal mobility positively. We sug­
gest that two factors are at work when vertical positions are beneficial 
for new entrants. First, vertical positions have positive effects when 
the market logics of the targeted new market are similar to those of 
the market from which entrants come. In the British merchant ship­
ping industry, high-status entrants could enjoy the benefits of their 
vertical positions because of the similarity between the markets. The 
incumbents could understand how entrants earned their vertical posi­
tions in other markets and, in turn, believe that these entrants would 
uphold the moral community of the industry because of the similarity 
between the markets (Podolny and Scott Morton, 1999). On the con­
trary, the market logics of the commercial and investment banking 
industries were different, so high-status commercial banks could not 
fully enjoy the benefits of high status in the new investment banking 
industry. Second, vertical positions are advantageous for horizontal 
mobility when it is difficult for potential exchange partners to evalu­
ate product quality ex ante. Podolny (2001) argued that occupying 
high vertical positions is most valuable for organizations when it is 
difficult for their audiences to evaluate the quality of their products, 
which implies that organizations in high vertical positions are more 
likely to focus on markets in which audiences face more uncertainty.
Future research on market spaces with organizational mobility
Whether vertical mobility is primarily due to targeted investments or 
targeted affiliations, or whether vertical positions have a positive or 
negative effect on horizontal organizational mobility, future research 
must consider the extent to which basic characteristics of the market 
space itself affect mobility. We propose three future research ques­
tions that address how the market space with different characteristics 
could affect vertical and horizontal mobility. First, because the distri­
bution of organizations across vertical positions varies from market to 
market, it is important to examine whether organizational mobility is 
more likely in market spaces with continuous vertical positions or in
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spaces with discontinuous vertical positions. Second, some categories 
have clear and unambiguous boundaries, whereas others have fuzzy 
boundaries. Future studies should examine how the characteristics of 
the boundaries around vertical and horizontal categories affect ver­
tical and horizontal organizational mobility. Third, future research 
should approach the status-identity framework from a dynamic mar­
ket perspective and ask whether vertical status or horizontal organ­
izational mobility is more likely in new market spaces with emerging 
vertical positions or in old market spaces with established vertical 
positions.
D yn am ic m arket sp aces
The third type of research question moves away from viewing the 
horizontal and vertical categories as exogenously fixed categories. By 
allowing the horizontal and vertical categories to change, the focus 
shifts from the positions organizations occupy in a market space to 
the market space itself and the boundaries that separate the categor­
ies that define the market space. Hannan and Freeman (1989) noted 
that it is important to identify and explain the segregating and blend­
ing processes that institutionalize and deinstitutionalize the boundar­
ies that make it possible to distinguish between different categories. 
Our status-identity framework suggests focusing on identifying and 
explaining the segregating and blending processes that result in the 
creation and destruction of both horizontal and vertical categories.
Creating categories
A growing stream of research focuses on the emergence of new hori­
zontal product categories, whereas hardly any research focuses on the 
emergence of new vertical status categories. The main emphasis in 
research on horizontal category creation is to identify and explain the 
segregation processes that ensure the emergence of a new category. 
We identified two different approaches to the segregation processes 
that ensure horizontal category emergence.
The first approach focuses on how nascent categories are populated. 
The main argument here is ecological density dependence (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1989; Carroll and Hannan, 2000). As the density (i.e., 
the number) of organizations in a nascent category increases, the 
nascent category gains constitutive legitimacy and becomes taken
The im portance o f  status in markets 107
for granted as a category. Adopting this approach, Ruef (2000) first 
identified a comprehensive array of populated and unpopulated 
horizontal or market identities in the healthcare industry. Next he 
showed that the likelihood that an unpopulated category becomes 
populated depended partly on the density of healthcare organiza­
tions in similar neighboring horizontal categories. McKendrick 
et al. (2003) argued that horizontal organizational forms emanate 
from the density of producers that have a “perceptually focused 
identity” because they mainly operate within that particular hori­
zontal category. They then showed that the density of focused disk 
array producers increased the entry rate into and decreased the exit 
rate from the horizontal disk array category, thus ensuring that the 
category was being populated. And Kennedy (2008) argued that the 
patterns of associations among market entrants found in the public 
discourse about the market provide an important basis for studying 
market formation. He found that another way to legitimate a new 
market is to enable a census of its entrants, which transforms the 
horizontal category into something that seems real to other market 
participants.
The second approach shifts the focus from how nascent categor­
ies are being populated to how the nascent categories emerged in 
the first place. Compared to the population of a category, there is 
less research on the actual emergence of categories. McKendrick and 
Carroll (2001) examined the creation of a market for disk arrays 
in order to understand when and where new organizational forms 
emerge. By tracing the early history of the disk array market, they 
concluded that the emerging category for disk array producers ultim­
ately failed to cohere into a mature category because most disk 
array producers derived their primary market identities from other 
activities. Jensen (2010) examined the creation of a market for sex- 
comedy movies in 1970s Denmark to understand how market iden­
tities are used to legitimate new normatively illegitimate or socially 
unacceptable products. He traced how filmmakers created a new 
horizontal film genre by combining elements from pornography and 
comedy selectively in film posters to carve a new unique horizontal 
position for sex-comedies. Jensen also showed that the vertical posi­
tions actors occupied helped to ensure that film audiences actually 
viewed the new horizontal category as a normatively legitimate cat­
egory. Middle-status actors were frequently used because they both
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provided legitimacy to the sex-comedies, unlike the low-status actors 
in illegitimate pornography, and had lower opportunity costs, unlike 
high-status actors.
Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) examined the emergence of the 
microbrewery category in the US brewing industry. They focused on 
the creation of a new market identity for the specialty beer segment 
that excluded major brewers from entering the specialty segment by 
emphasizing tradition and authenticity rooted in small organizations 
using craft brewing methods and natural ingredients. The microbrew­
ery category raises an important question: is the microbrewery cat­
egory a horizontal (product) category or a vertical (status) category? 
The microbrewery category is a new horizontal product category that 
encompasses different product characteristics including natural ingre­
dients and traditional brewing methods, but it could also be viewed 
as a new vertical status category that positions microbreweries and 
specialty beers above the major breweries and mass-market beers. 
We view the microbrewery market identity as a combination: a new 
horizontal product category in which the distribution of members is 
skewed toward higher vertical positions. Even when the major brew­
eries meet the quality standards set by microbreweries, many con­
sumers are unwilling to accept them as members of the microbrewery 
category because they derive their core market identity from a prod­
uct category with a lower vertical status distribution. It may therefore 
be easier for organizations from more distant product categories but 
with a higher vertical status distribution, such as wineries and restau­
rants, to enter the microbrewery category without concealing their 
core market identity.
Combining and splitting categories
Besides the creation of new horizontal or vertical categories, it is also 
important to examine how existing categories combine and split. 
Whereas research on the creation of new categories focuses mainly 
on the segregating processes that erect and protect the boundaries 
around new categories, research on combining and splitting categor­
ies focuses on the blending processes that erode existing category 
boundaries. Rao, Monin, and Durand (2003) examined first how 
nouvelle cuisine split off from classical cuisine as part of the broader 
1960s anti-authoritarian social movements that also transformed
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other French cultural institutions including literature, theater, and 
film. They argued that activist chefs both exploited the foundations of 
classical cuisine, including its emphasis on simplicity, and celebrated 
their differences with its dominant orthodoxy, including the lack of 
autonomy for chefs in splitting off nouvelle from classical cuisine. 
Next Rao, Monin, and Durand (2005) examined how the categor­
ical boundaries of classical and nouvelle cuisines weakened as the 
borrowing of elements from the rival category diffused broadly and 
resulted in the hybridization of the two cuisines. Although the authors 
(2005) focused on borrowing as a blending process that weakens the 
boundary between horizontal product categories, they also reported 
that the diffusion of borrowing was triggered by chefs in high vertical 
positions, which emphasizes that horizontal categories and vertical 
categories interact to shape market spaces.
Kim and Jensen (2010) adopted a different approach. Rather than 
focusing on actually changing the horizontal product categories, they 
argued that horizontal product categories are constitutive parts of 
market identity taxonomies, and focused on how the taxonomic level 
at which organizations are identified affects their perceived market 
identity. They argued specifically that even if individual product cat­
egories remain exogenously fixed, an organization can still influence 
the taxonomic level at which it is identified by its audiences. Toyota, for 
example, can emphasize that it belongs to the subcategory “Japanese 
auto manufacturer” in some situations and the basic category “auto 
manufacturer” in other situations. Market identity taxonomies thus 
provide organizations with a source of agency that enables them to 
shape their perceived appeal depending on the specific situation and 
the specific audience with whom they interact. Or, to use the dis­
tinction between segregating and blending processes, market iden­
tity taxonomies are both  segregating and  blending mechanisms: they 
allow organizations to split categories by moving from categories to 
subcategories and they allow organizations to combine categories by 
moving from subcategories to categories. Simple moves between cat­
egory levels can in themselves affect the market appeal of an organ­
ization: Kim and Jensen (2010) showed that opera companies that 
interspersed modern operas in their repertoires to avoid the emer­
gence of a negative subcategory sold more season tickets even if the 
operas in the repertoire remained the same.
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Future research on dynamic market spaces
There are still many areas to be explored in the domain of dynamic 
market spaces. First, relating back to the disadvantages of occupy­
ing a highly ranked vertical position, future research can focus on 
what constrained high-status organizations from creating or redefin­
ing categories. Durand, Rao, and Monin (2007), for example, sug­
gested a further examination of how broader cultural factors such as 
social movements can restrict high-status organizations from taking 
advantage of new technologies. Rao (2009) provided a partial answer 
to the question by showing that the anti-biotechnology movement in 
Germany prevented high-status organizations from commercializing 
new technology due to their high visibility, while low-status organi­
zations remained largely unaffected. Building on this study, future 
research can provide more evidence regarding the liabilities of high- 
status positions in creating new categories or changing their identities. 
Second, while some studies examine the creation of new horizontal 
categories, few studies focus on the creation of new vertical categor­
ies within a horizontal category. Organizations can, however, verti­
cally expand a category, for example, by creating high-end products. 
Third, future research can explore how different vertical positions 
affect the creation of new categories and how organizations of dif­
ferent vertical positions respond differently to the newly created cat­
egories. Which organizations will be the first to create new categories, 
for example, and which organizations will be the first to move into a 
new category?
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have developed a new status-identity framework by 
integrating work on status as positions in social systems and market 
identity as membership in social categories. According to this frame­
work, status refers to a position in a social system or intersection 
of horizontally and vertically arrayed social categories, and market 
identity refers to the schema that codifies the minimal expectations of 
that particular intersection. We used the status-identity framework 
to systematically review status research in markets and, more import­
antly, to identify promising areas for future research. Most research 
focuses on the advantages and, to a lesser extent, the disadvantages 
of occupying a particular vertical position, and emphasizes how they
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affect quality perceptions and production, organizational agency, and 
legitimacy. Some research focuses on vertical and horizontal mobility 
in the market space, most of which emphasizes the difficulties of mov­
ing to higher vertical positions or how a vertical position produces 
the opportunity for horizontal mobility by leveraging status from one 
horizontal category to another. The least researched area focuses on 
the creation and destruction of the horizontal and vertical categories 
themselves, in particular, as this area of research relates to the actual 
creation of categories rather than the density-dependent legitimiza­
tion of nascent categories. Finally, we identified specific new research 
opportunities in all the three main research areas identified by our 
status-identity framework, including the consequences of occupying 
multiple positions in the market space, the extent to which the fuzzi­
ness of category boundaries affect organizational mobility, and how 
new vertical positions emerge.
Although we believe that our status-identity framework both pro­
vides conceptual clarity to status research and a systematic approach 
to identifying future research opportunities, it is also clear that the 
status-identity framework has its own limitations that require fur­
ther conceptual development. First, the status-identity framework 
represents a single social system with a single audience that agrees on 
a single ranking of products and organizations. However, organiza­
tions sometimes participate in multiple markets for the same product 
and therefore have multiple audiences that may rank the same prod­
ucts and organizations differently. GM’s Buick is considered one of 
the high-status automobiles among Chinese consumers, for example, 
whereas American consumers do not rate Buick automobiles so highly. 
We are less concerned with situations in which the different audiences 
are clearly separated, such as American and Chinese consumers, 
because these situations simply call for applying the framework sep­
arately to each of the audience groups. It is more problematic when 
different audiences are not clearly separated, which could happen 
when mobility across cultural boundaries allows different audiences 
to merge, if non-separation allows different rankings to coexist per­
manently. However, we find the permanent coexistence of radically 
different rankings unlikely, because interactions among the audiences 
will eventually lead to a convergence in rankings due to simple status 
arbitrage between audiences with different rankings (or the abandon­
ment of rankings that are perceived to be less valid).
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Second, the status-identity framework represents a market space 
at a particular horizontal and vertical category level, but most cat­
egories are parts of a broader nested category system that are not eas­
ily represented in the basic framework. As mentioned before, Toyota 
is a member of a number of different nested categories including 
“manufacturer,” “auto manufacturer,” and “Japanese auto manufac­
turer,” and Toyota may emphasize its membership in each of these 
nested horizontal categories in different situations. Moving between 
category levels changes the market space and the included audience 
groups, and therefore calls for applying the framework at each cat­
egory level. As with the case of multiple markets with different audi­
ence groups, if we want to examine any relationships across different 
category levels, we need to take into consideration the different audi­
ences associated with each category level. Third, we assumed in our 
framework that all actors can be mapped unambiguously onto a par­
ticular position. However, some category boundaries can be relatively 
unclear or fuzzy, making it difficult to map the status positions onto 
the given framework. In the case of newly established categories such 
as sex-comedies or microbreweries, for example, it may be difficult to 
position a particular organization as high status, middle status or low 
status on the vertical dimension. In addition, the boundaries between 
the horizontal categories themselves may not always be clear. The 
framework may therefore be more directly applicable to established 
market spaces than to emerging market spaces.
We have developed and used the status-identity framework in the 
context of markets and organizations, but we believe that it can be 
generalized to other contexts. We have already discussed how the 
status-identity framework can accommodate different markets at 
the same level of analysis, such as the American and Chinese auto 
markets, and how it can accommodate different markets at different 
levels of analysis, such as “auto manufacturers” and “Japanese auto 
manufacturers.” The abstract nature of the status-identity framework 
allows it to be used in market as well as non-market contexts and to 
focus on organizations as well as individuals, groups, and other social 
actors. When moving from one context to another, the horizontal 
and vertical categories obviously change but the fundamental insight 
remains the same: a status is an intersection of horizontally and 
vertically arrayed social categories, and status is important because it
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provides an identity that facilitates and constrains the actions of the 
social actors in that particular intersection. Regardless of its flexi­
bility and generalizability, the ultimate value of our status-identity 
framework is determined mainly by the actual insights it provides by 
being used in specific empirical research projects.
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